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ABSTRACT
The Earth Summit of 1992 held in Rio de Janeiro awakened the consciousness of 
the world to the danger of climate change. The establishment of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change provided the platform for parties to 
negotiate on ways of moving forward. The global acknowledgement of the weightiness 
of the climate change and the future of the planet galvanized international agreements 
to this regard. Consequently, a landmark agreement was brokered in 1992 at Kyoto, 
Japan and 2015 in Paris, France. However, the strong issues of national interest 
tend to bedevil the implementation that would take the world forward on climate 
change. The chapter therefore examined multilateralism from the platform of climate 
change conferences and analyzed the political undertone behind disappointing 
outcomes even when most of the negotiators realized that the only way to salvage 
the impending doom is a multilateral binding agreement when nation-state can 
subsume their narrow interest.
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INTRODUCTION
Climate change instigated by anthropogenic greenhouse gases has arisen as one of the 
most significant environmental concerns confronting the international community. 
For example, greenhouse gases-especially fossil fuel-based carbon dioxide emissions 
gathers in the atmosphere as an outcome of human activities. These progressive 
intensifications in greenhouse gas concentrations cause various changes in the 
climates such as a rise in the world’s average temperature (Bohringer, 2003). Since 
the end of the last century and the beginning of the 21st century, its impacts on 
weather and other natural environmental heritages have become increasingly felt.
As such, climate change is now globally acknowledged as one of the most 
important challenges facing the world. Its impacts on the society and environment 
are unprecedented and better imagined that real. Nonetheless scholars of climate 
change have recommended that global greenhouse gas emissions must reduce swiftly 
to mitigate the impending consequences resulting from increase in temperature. 
This in the actual sense is the scientific underpinning of this political problem 
(Shanahan, 2009).
Therefore, the dire need for humanity to find solution to these problems have 
created an awareness amongst nations of the world to embrace a collective mechanism 
or multilateral approach through a platform called United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) established under the auspices of the 
United Nations.
The paper therefore examined multilateralism from the platform of climate 
change conferences and analyzed the political undertone behind disappointing 
outcomes even when most of the negotiators realized that the only way to salvage 
the impending doom is a multilateral binding agreement.
METHODOLOGY
The paper relied heavily on secondary sources especially commentaries and reports 
arising from the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties (COP) conferences. Books, 
newspaper reports, conference materials and materials sourced from the internet were 
most useful. Data sourced through these were analyzed through the employment 
of qualitative descriptive analysis with the backdrop of theory of multilateralism.
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THE CONCEPT OF MULTILATERALISM
Multilateralism is a concept of international relations that is different from 
unilateralism, bilateralism or regionalism. It is ‘the practice of coordinating national 
policies in groups of three or more states, through ad hoc arrangements or by means 
of an entrenched institutions’ (Keohane, 1990, p.731; Yarbrough and Yarbrough, 
1992). To Ruggie (1992, pp.567-568), multilateralism meant ‘coordinating relations 
among three or more states’, but ‘in accordance with certain principles’ that govern 
dealings between them. These definitions limit it to arrangements involving states. It 
focuses mainly (albeit not exclusively) on institutions, defined as ‘inherited patterns 
of rules and relationships that can affect beliefs and expectations, and as potential 
tools for the pursuit of their own objectives’ (Keohane, 2000 p. 96; Keohane and 
Nye, 2000a; 2000b).
But multilateral cooperation occurs between states as well as other concerned 
global stakeholders to arrive at a solution to common concerns. Multilateralism is 
voluntary and (more or less) institutionalized cooperation governed by principles 
and norms, with rules that apply (more or less) equally to all. Inherent in the 
conceptualization of multilateralism is the concept of diffuse reciprocity which was 
first discussed by Keohane (1986). It means that state actors expect to achieve gains 
from multilateralism in the long term and on a variety of issues. In other words, they 
expect the arrangement to ‘yield a rough equivalence of benefits in the aggregate and 
over time’ (Ruggie, 1992 p.571). Multilateralism becomes institutionalized when 
‘multilateral arrangements with persistent rules’ emerge (Keohane, 1990 p. 733).
In modern times, multilateral agreements sprung up mainly to manage relations 
amongst states based on the principle of state sovereignty. Contrary to this, in the 
17th century, multilateral arrangements manage property issues, such as the control of 
oceans. However, until the 19th century multilateral cooperation, was relatively rare. 
This century witnessed more frequent multilateral cooperation with the signature of 
several treaties on issues including trade, river transport and public health.
One effect of growing interdependence was to internationalize issues once 
considered to be strictly national. Most multilateral agreements during the 19th 
century, however, did not lead to the creation of formal organizations. In contrast 
to previous forms, the 20th century multilateralism brought about the formation 
of formal multilateral organizations, including a multi-purpose organization with 
universal membership. A shift from loose, informal agreements to formal organizations 
inevitably had an impact on the International Order (Ruggie, 1992). Conversely, 
common standards and regulations were developed to facilitate economic exchanges. 
The economies of major powers also became increasingly interdependent, thus 
encouraging the recognition of common interests (Armstrong and Lloyd et. al., 2004).
34
From Kyoto to Paris
It is based on this premise that the UNFCCC was created to provide mechanism 
for stakeholders to formulate a mutual strategic understanding or view on mutual 
climate change goals and to institute collaborative activities that would offer common 
solutions to the global problem of climate change. It also provides a platform for 
negotiation on climate change policies, exchange of opinions on salient issues in 
climate change debates and development of concrete activities to curb climate change 
through the carrying out of specific cooperative tasks (Romano, 2010).
The gathering of Kyoto Japan in 1997 fulfilled aspects of these issues in the sense 
that an agreement considered significant to achieve the objective of the gathering 
emerged but owing to attitude of state actors in its follow up weakened the contents 
of the document. Subsequently the inability to achieve progress since 2005 when 
Russia ratified the protocol to the conference in Copenhagen and Cancun tend to 
give credence to alternative views of multilateralism. For instance, Martin (1992) 
acknowledges that multilateralism at times may not be the most effective strategy 
of promoting international cooperation especially when governments have doubts 
about the repercussion of ‘losing today’ without considering the long term mutually 
beneficial effect. Obviously companionable with a view of multilateralism as an 
anachronism is one that considers it a ‘weapon of the weak’ (Kagan, 2002 p.4). Put 
differently, states that pursue multilateral agreements are those that lack the power, 
however measured, to enforce solutions to international problems that are of interests 
to them (Caroline & Peterson 2009).
THE UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK 
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE
The UN climate-change negotiations often take place under the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which is an international treaty formed 
at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in 1992 to avert hazardous climate 
change ensuing from emissions of greenhouse gases. A total of 192 Parties ratified 
the UNFCCC. It entered into force in 1994. Under the auspices of the Convention, 
countries consented to protecting the climate system for both the present and future 
generations according to their ‘common but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capabilities’, meaning that developed countries ‘should take the lead in 
combating climate change and its adverse effects’. Parties also agreed that the degree 
to which developing countries can meet their treaty obligations is dependent on the 
extent to which developed countries provide technology and finance. It was also 
established that ‘economic and social development and poverty eradication are the 
first and overriding priorities of the developing country parties’ (Shanahan, 2009).
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Therefore, the UNFCCC’s stated goal is the “stabilization of greenhouse gas 
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system” (UNFCCC, 1992, Article 2).
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND CLIMATE CHANGE
The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, the earth 
summit that took place in Rio de Janeiro Brazil was the largest ever international 
conference and the central aim was to identify the principles of action towards 
“sustainable development” in the future (Elliot, 1999, p. 4). According to Adam, 
(1990), the term sustainable development has gained ground beyond the confines 
of global environmental organization as it has become embraced in the political and 
academic field. According to Mather and Chapman (1995) the primary output of 
the Agenda 21 document of UN Conference on Environment and Development was 
driven at reconciling conservation actions into the 21st century. More so, it contained 
a substantial debate over the meaning and practice of sustainable development.
Literarily, sustainable development refers to maintaining development over time. 
Turner, (1988 p.12) defines it as follows;
In principle, such an optimal (sustainable growth) policy would seek to maintain 
an “acceptable” rate of growth in per-capital real incomes without depleting the 
national capital asset stock or the natural environment asset stock. Development that 
meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations 
to meet their own needs. (World Commission on Environment and Development, 
1987 p.43)
It can be correctly stated that sustainable development is fundamentally about 
reconciling development and the environmental resources on which the society 
depends (Elliot, 1999).
The challenges of sustainable development include clearing off the contamination 
or pollution impacts of the past development. Most times the impacts of pollutions 
do not occur immediately as is the case of climate change. It accumulates over time. 
This means that the need for sustainable development in the future is also confirmed 
by the human cost of patterns and processes of development to date (Elliot, 1999).
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The Kyoto Japan Conference
The Kyoto Protocol was negotiated during the third conference of the parties (COP3) 
to the United Nations Framework Convention of Climate Change. The Conference 
was held between 1 and 11 December 1997 in Kyoto, Japan. The detailed rules for 
the implementation of the Protocol called the “Marrakech Accords” were adopted 
at COP 7 in Marrakech in 2001. The Conference was attended by over 10,000 
participants, covering delegates from International Governmental Organizations 
(IGOs), governments and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and the press. 
The conference included high-level section which featured statements from over 
125 ministers. After intense informal and formal negotiations spanning week and 
a half, Parties to the UNFCCC adopted the Kyoto Protocol on 11 December 1997 
(IISD, 2007).
The Climate Change Convention provided the institutional framework for 
international climate policy. Most of the countries that are Parties to the agreement 
have ratified the Convention. Parties to the Climate Change Convention hold periodic 
meetings called Conferences of Parties (COP) aimed at promoting and reviewing 
efforts to contend with global warming.
Kyoto Protocol and Issues Arising From It
In 1997, Parties to the UNFCCC adopted a document tagged Kyoto Protocol which 
outlines agreements reached at the Conference. This agreement which is meant 
to be binding on all parties on ratification by a given number of them came into 
force in 2005 after Russia ratified. Ever since, over 189 countries have ratified the 
protocol. Apart from the fact that it sets targets for developed countries, it was also 
legally binding, and created vital international monitoring, reporting and verification 
instruments to ensure compliance. Developed countries were obliged to limit their 
emissions to an average of 5.2 per cent below 1990 levels between 2008 and 2012. 
To ensure this is achieved, the protocol created ‘flexibility mechanisms’ – such as 
carbon trading and Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), which permits developed 
countries to achieve their target emission goals by financing emissions reductions 
in developing countries (Shanahan, 2009; IISD, 1997).
The key characteristics of the Kyoto Protocol is that it established obligatory/
mandatory targets for the European community and 37 industrialized countries for 
reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, amounting to an average of 5 percent 
against 1990 levels over the five-year period 2008-2012 (Friends of the Earth, 
2009). It necessitates industrialized countries as listed in its Annex B - to reduce 
their emissions of greenhouse gases, most especially carbon dioxide (CO2) from 
fossil fuel combustion. In specific terms, Annex B countries pledged to reduce their 
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GHG emissions by 5.2% on average below aggregate 1990 emission levels between 
2008-2012 their commitment period (UNFCCC, 1997). The agreement will not 
enter into force until the double-triggers conditions are met: Firstly, the national 
parliaments of at least 55 Parties to the Convention must ratify the treaty. Secondly, 
at least 55% of the total 1990 CO2 emissions must be accounted for by industrialized 
countries that are amongst the ratifying parties.
Several controversial issues on the implementation of the Convention were 
outlined at the Kyoto Conference. The issues include credits for carbon sinks, i.e. 
agricultural soils and forests that store CO2, and the question of restricted versus 
full tradability of emission rights across Annex B countries. In March 2001, the 
United States under President George W. Bush unequivocally refused to ratify the 
Protocol due to the huge cost it would have on the U.S. economy and due to the 
unacceptability of the exemption of developing countries such as China and India 
from binding emission targets.
The major difference between the Kyoto Protocol and the UNFCCC is that, while 
the UNFCCC admonished industrialized countries to steady GHG emissions, the 
Protocol obligates them to do so (because of its binding power). The recognition of 
the fact that developed countries are principal contributors to the current high levels 
of GHG emissions in the atmosphere as the result of over 150 years of industrial 
actions, the Protocol places a heavier emission reduction burden on them under the 
principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities.” To date, 189 Parties of 
the Convention have ratified the Protocol.
The Kyoto Protocol has been hailed by a section of the intellectual community as 
a milestone in multilateralism. Proponents of the Protocol celebrate it as a landmark 
in international climate policy and celebrate it as a momentous achievement towards 
mitigating global warming. However, another point of view sees the approach in terms 
of its efficacy in the implementation of the agreement, namely setting timetables 
and targets for emission reductions as seriously defective (King, 2015).
Without any hesitation, the Protocol was a product of over 10 years of negotiations 
on climate policy. It became the first legally binding universal treaty on climate 
protection, and entered into force in 2005. The advocates of multilateralism celebrate 
the protocol as a breakthrough in international climate policy, because:
1.  It envisaged considerable emission reductions for the developed world vis-à-
vis emissions from their business activities.
2.  It established an extensive global instrument for deepening and widening 
climate protection actions in the future.
3.  It constituted the pioneer international environmental agreement that was 
built on market based mechanisms to determine cost-efficient reactions to the 
undoubted need for GHG reduction.
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4.  It designed a burden-sharing scheme set up for the first commitment period 
which ended in 2012 (Bohringer, 2003).
In the light of the above, proponents stated that despite an effective emission 
reductions in the initial commitment period, the ratification of Kyoto is important 
for the further policy process of climate protection. To them, Kyoto Protocol has 
been able to establish a flexible broad-based universal instrument that offers an 
appreciated starting point for modeling effective climate policies in the future 
(Bohringer, 2003).
On another hand, antagonists of the Kyoto Protocol avowed that it was bound to 
fail due to the flaws in its architecture. They concluded “that the Kyoto Protocol is 
an impractical policy focused on achieving an unrealistic and inappropriate goal” 
(McKibbin & Wilcoxen, 2002 p.127). Some of the key points advanced against the 
Kyoto Protocol goes as follows:
1.  “The Kyoto Protocol is defective on both efficiency criteria (spatial and 
temporal equalization of abatement costs) because it omits a substantial fraction 
of emissions; (Thus failing the spatial criterion) and has no plans beyond the 
first period (thus not attending to the temporal dimension)” (Nordhaus, 2001 
p.8);
2.  “Kyoto does not deter free-riding and non-compliance” (Barrett, 1998 p. 38);
3.  “The most fundamental defect of the Kyoto Protocol is that the policy lacks 
any connection to ultimate economic or environmental policy objective” 
(Nordhaus, 2001 p.13);
4.  “The Kyoto Protocol has an arbitrary allocation of transfers. Moreover, since 
developing countries are omitted, they are completely overlooked in the 
transfers” (Nordhaus, 2001 p.9);
5.  “The Protocol permit trading [as the principal policy instrument of the Kyoto 
Protocol] runs the risk of being highly inefficient, given uncertainties in the 
marginal cost of abating greenhouse gas emissions. This would probably 
generate large transfers of wealth between countries” (McKibbin & Wilcoxen, 
2002 p.26);
6.  Opponents to the Protocol have condemned it as a “deeply flawed agreement 
that manages to be both economically inefficient and politically impractical” 
(McKibbin & Wilcoxen, 2002 p.107); and
7.  “No individual government has an incentive to police the agreement. The Kyoto 
Protocol can only work if it includes an elaborate and expensive international 
mechanism for monitoring and enforcement” (McKibbin & Wilcoxen, 2002 
p.126).
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In fact, years after the demanding negotiations for its implementation, the Protocol 
has not yet been implemented, even after Russia’s ratification made of the number 
required for it to take effective legal status. The refusal of the United States to ratify 
the Protocol as well as the full tradability of emission rights granted to the former 
Eastern Bloc in surplus of its estimated future emissions imply that the Kyoto 
Protocol is very likely to achieve very little in terms of global emission reductions 
(Springer, 2002). This evolution seems to affirm the position of the antagonists of 
the Kyoto Protocol that its central approach of setting timetables and targets for 
emission reductions is seriously faulty (Bohringer, 2003).
COP 15 Copenhagen Climate Change Conferences
From 7 to 18 December 2009, the fifteenth Conference of the Parties (COP) of 
UNFCCC took place in Copenhagen. 120 Heads of State and Governments and 
over 50,000 participants participated making the Conference the utmost profile 
meeting of any multilateral environmental issue (Sindico, 2010). Before COP 15 
international climate change debates have been along two parallel tracks. One was 
under the Kyoto Protocol and the UNFCCC. The first track was launched in Bali, 
Indonesia, at COP 13 of the UNFCCC, and countries were to devise ways to achieve 
“full, effective and sustained implementation of the Convention through long-term 
cooperative action, up to and beyond 2012.” Under the second track, countries have 
been negotiating ways to enhance further Kyoto Protocol Annex I Parties’ obligations 
(Sindico, 2010). Both tracks were to have ended at COP 15, but it was evident in 
the meetings preceding to COP15 and COP/MOP5 that this would not be achieved.
The Copenhagen Accord does not specify targets for GHG emissions reductions for 
any sector. It states that deep international emissions cuts are needed to hold the 
increase in global temperature to under two degrees Celsius. The Accord relies on 
industrialized nations to set their own economy wide emission reduction targets to 
take effect in 2020 by January 31, 2010. (Copenhagen Accord, 2009) 
The Copenhagen Accord refers to very loose emission reduction essential to 
prevent a 2.0 degree rise in overall temperatures taking cognizance of the general 
goal of the UNFCCC. However, any specific cap was not establish. While COP 
15 provided for a much more flexible approach as far as it gives each State, both 
developing and industrialized, the chance to decide its level of climate change 
mitigation level or goal, the Kyoto Protocol established a general cap baseline and 
also indicated what level of reductions each Annex I Party had to achieve between 
2008 and 2012 commitment period. Thus, the environmental integrity of a regime 
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based on the Copenhagen Accord would be contingent on whether the compliance 
with the emissions reductions level provided for would actually reduce an overall 
rise in temperatures to 2.0 degrees or even better, 1.5 degrees (Sindico, 2011).
The flexibility of the emission ceiling rate became a major weakness of COP 15 
because countries of the EU in particular, were aiming at establishing new legally 
binding international treaty. This is because, a legally binding instrument will have 
enforceable obligations that are binding upon State Parties as well as a compliance 
mechanism that address situations of non-compliance. So it can be induced that 
COP 15 had no enforceable mechanism and lacked a strong compliance system.
Hopes were frustrated and amplified when, after two weeks of negotiations, a 
fairly small but influential group of countries led by the United States was able to 
negotiate the Copenhagen Accord (Sindico, 2010).
The compliance mechanism of the Copenhagen Accord has the ability to take 
actions against countries not complying with their commitments under the Kyoto 
Protocol while the nonexistence of a compliance structure in COP 15 offers states 
freedom for compromises. In the Copenhagen Accord “compliance” becomes 
“measurement, report and verification (MRV)” which seems to be designed in three 
diverse ways depending on whose mitigation action is considered. First, climate change 
mitigation action enshrined in pledges from Annex I countries will be “measured, 
reported and verified (MRV) in accordance with existing guidelines adopted by 
the Conference of the Parties”. Second, mitigation action assumed by developing 
countries will be subjected to nationally established MRV. The Copenhagen Accord 
necessitates mitigation actions to be taken by Non-Annex I Parties vis-à-vis their 
domestic MRV. Bi-annually, the outcome will be reported through their national 
communications channels. Lastly, non-Annex I Parties can also choose to implement 
mitigation acts, which will be supported by international support. In this case, the 
Copenhagen Accord establishes that the national mitigation actions will be subjected 
to international MRV in agreement with rules adopted by the COP (Sindico, 2010).
The COP 15 can be said to be a failure in that it did not meet the expectation of 
the need of a binding mechanism that could replace the Kyoto Protocol or at best 
supplement it. The Copenhagen agreements were merely taken note of but not adopted.
The Accord also failed to address the major challenges of the Kyoto Protocol which 
is the failure to ensure that the US, the main emitter of greenhouse gas emissions 
(the US) ratifies it and the fact that emission reduction obligations was not set for 
evolving economies such as China, India and Brazil.
As such, the conference was said to be a failure for not achieving binding 
commitments to lessen global greenhouse gas emission levels adequate to meet 
the standards identified by about 3,000 prominent global scientists of the United 
Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) as measures to prevent 
calamitous costs such as food disruption, sea level rise leading to massive population 
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displacement, tropical disease migration, water shortages, and obliteration of 
biodiversity (Allison & Bindoff et al., 2009).
From an environmental point of view, the Copenhagen Accord was a failure 
because, even if Parties complied with their pledges, the general rise in average 
temperatures will not be reduced to 2 degrees. Additionally, the flexibility Copenhagen 
Accord provided for countries in their climate change mitigation action was too much.
From a legal view point the Copenhagen Accord also fails because the obligations it 
provided for were voluntary while the MRV system shifted away from the compliance 
system existing in the Kyoto Protocol.
Finally, in spite of all the uncertainties that one may have on the legal, environmental 
and political flaws of the Accord, the undeniable fact is that it was the first time in 
about a decade that emerging developing countries and the US agreed to a framework 
to mitigate and adapt climate change in the future. The Copenhagen Accord was 
negotiated principally between the United States and the BASIC countries (Brazil, 
South Africa, India and China). Put differently, the involvement of key emerging 
countries of China, India, Brazil and South Africa and the United States, in the 
negotiation of the final Accord as well as the agreement by Mexico to host the next 
climate conference were quite significant. This is as a result of the prior decline of 
the countries in making commitments to greenhouse gas emission reduction for the 
Kyoto Protocol (Kampert, 2001).
While the convergence of 193 nations at Copenhagen to address the global climate 
problems were truly unique (Broder, 2009; Fahrenthold, 2009), the Copenhagen 
Climate Conference and its Accord have been generally regarded as a failure (Darren, 
2009; Eilperin & Faiola, 2009; Garman, 2009).
COP 16, Cancun, Climate Change Conferences
The decision of the United States led by George Walker Bush to renege on the Kyoto 
agreement gave environmentalist hope that COP 16 United Nations Climate Change 
Conference in Cancun, Mexico, which took place from 29 November to 11 December 
2010 would provide the platform to make the US commit to climate change.
Expectations for Cancun were modest, with few anticipating a legally-binding 
outcome or agreement on each outstanding issue. The key challenge that was faced 
by the countries of the world was to continue the process of constructing a sound 
foundation for meaningful, long term global action which was accomplished in 
Cancun.
Nevertheless, many still hoped that Cancun would produce meaningful progress on 
some of the key issues. In the lead-up to the conference, several matters were widely 
identified as areas where a balanced “package” of outcomes could be agreed. These 
issues included mitigation, adaptation, financing, technology, reducing emissions 
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from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries. The conservation, 
sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest and its monitoring, 
reporting and verification (MRV) were also included. Negotiations on these key 
issues took place throughout the two-week meeting (IISD, 2010).
One of the major decisions resulting from COP 16 is to reduce deforestation and 
forest degradation through the creation of financial incentives to fund the conservation, 
sustainable use and enhancement of forest carbon stocks (REDD+). This decision 
on a REDD+ framework could have positive and/or negative impacts depending its 
application. There is broad consensus that REDD+ initiatives have the potential to 
conserve biodiversity and ecosystem services, improve local livelihoods, promote 
adaptation, and provide incentives to reform forest governance if well designed.
There is also broad recognition of the negative impacts REDD+ implementation 
could bring. Deleterious consequences might include the infringement of indigenous 
rights; introduction of invasive tree species (i.e. eucalyptus) to ‘grow’ CO2 credits; 
ongoing degradation of natural forests leading to loss of biodiversity, species 
extinction and ongoing CO2 emissions; labour and human rights abuses; destruction 
of plants relied upon by local communities for medicine and nutrition; loss of 
customary access to forests; resulting decline in nutrition and human health of forest 
dependent communities; and the disruption of ecosystems and loss of ecosystem 
services (Perron-Welch, 2011).
The reality of REDD+ lies in the particularities of each project and whether that 
project adequately balances environmental, social and economic factors to achieve a 
sustainable solution supported and enforced by law or voluntary certification. In this 
vein, it is important to closely monitor the financial underpinnings of this incentive 
scheme to ensure equitable and ecological outcomes rather than those based on 
speculation and fraud and lead to ongoing forest death. Thus, good governance is 
one key to successful implementation at all levels (Perron-Welch, 2011). REDD+ 
will necessarily be impacted by, and have an impact on, the way that international 
rules and commitments play out. To achieve the goal of reducing emissions from 
deforestation and forest degradation, the international community will need to 
understand the interplay between pre-existing rules and commitments on forests 
and those made at the Cancun conference (Perron-Welch, 2011).
The delegates in Cancun succeeded in writing and adopting an agreement 
that assembles pledges of greenhouse gas (GHG) cuts by all of the world’s major 
economies, launches a fund to help the most vulnerable countries, and avoids some 
political landmines that could have blown up the talks, namely decisions on the 
(highly uncertain) future of the Kyoto Protocol. At the end only hope was dashed 
(Duruji & Duruji-Moses, 2016).
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Assessing the Key Elements of the Cancun Agreements
In a nut shell, the 32-page Cancun Agreements made provisions for the following 
issues:
First, the Cancun Agreements provide for emission mitigation targets and actions 
(submitted under the Copenhagen Accord) for approximately 80 countries-including, 
importantly, all of the major economies.
The Agreements codify pledges by the world’s largest emitters-including 
China, the United States, the European Union, India, and Brazil-to various targets 
and actions to reduce emissions by 2020. The distinction between Annex I and 
non- Annex I countries is blurred even more in the Cancun Agreements than it was 
in the Copenhagen Accord which does not signifies a step in the right direction. 
Also, for the first time, countries agreed – under an official UN agreement-to keep 
temperature increases below a global average of 2 degrees Celsius. This brings these 
aspirations, as well as the emission pledges of individual countries, into the formal 
UN process for the first time, essentially by adopting the Copenhagen Accord one 
year after it was “noted” at COP-15.
Another important aspect of the Accord hinges on the mechanisms for monitoring 
and verification that were laid out for “international consultation and analysis 
(ICA)” of developing country mitigation actions. Countries will report their GHG 
inventories to an independent panel of experts, which will monitor and verify reports 
of emissions cuts and actions.
Third, the Agreements establish a so-called Green Climate Fund to deliver 
financing for mitigation and adaptation. The World Bank was named as the interim 
trustee of the Fund despite the numerous objections from many developing countries, 
and even created an oversight board whose membership had about half of its members 
from the donor countries (Stavins, 2010)
More so, the developed countries on the platform of the Agreements agreed 
to mobilize $100 billion annually by 2020 to support mitigation and adaptation 
in developing countries. This fund would target sources from public and private 
resources (that is, carbon markets and private finance), bilateral and multilateral 
flows, as well as the Green Climate Fund. However, whether the resources ever 
grow to the size laid out in Copenhagen and Cancun will depend upon the individual 
actions of the wealthy nations of the world.
Fourthly, the Agreements advanced initiatives on tropical forest protection or better 
put, in UN parlance, Reduced Deforestation and Forest Degradation, or REDD+, by 
taking the next steps toward establishing a program in which the wealthy countries 
can help prevent deforestation in poor countries by possibly working through market 
mechanisms. This came despite exhortations from Bolivia and other leftist and left-
leaning countries to keep the reach of “global capitalism” out of the policy mix.
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Fifth, the Cancun Agreements established a structure to assess the needs and 
policies for the transfer to developing countries of technologies for clean energy 
and adaptation to climate Change, and a Climate Technology Center and Network 
(though yet undefined) to construct a global network to match technology suppliers 
with technology needs.
Also along this line was the fact that the Agreements endorsed an ongoing role for 
the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and other “market based mechanisms;” 
indicating that carbon capture and storage (CCS) projects should be eligible for 
carbon credits in the CDM an offer of special recognition for the situations of in 
Central and Eastern European countries (previously known in UN parlance as “parties 
undergoing transition to a market economy”) and Turkey, all of which are Annex I 
countries under the Kyoto Protocol, but decidedly poorer than the other members 
of that group of industrialized nations.
It embraces parallel processes of multilateral discussions on climate change 
policies. Also, there was movement forward with specific, narrow agreements, such 
as on: REDD+ (Reduced Deforestation and Forest Degradation, plus enhancement 
of forest carbon stocks); finance; and technology. Such movement forward has, in 
fact, occurred in all three domains in the Cancun Agreements.
In the light of the above discussions, the parties to the Cancun meetings could 
maintain sensible expectations and thereby develop effective plans. It was able to 
create a long-term action strategy to address the threat of global climate change. The 
conference was therefore able to map out for the countries of the world a pathway for 
an effective plan of action for climatic change challenges humanity currently faces. 
According to Stavins, (2010) the successes of the Cancun conference enumerated 
above could be attributed to the following reasons particularly in contrast with the 
outcome of the Copenhagen conference.
First, the Mexican government through careful and methodical planning over the 
past year prepared itself well, and displayed tremendous skill in presiding over the 
talks. Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs, Patricia Espinosa, the President of COP-
16, carefully took note of the objections of Bolivia (and, at times, several other leftist 
and left-leaning Latin American countries, known collectively as the ALBA states), 
and then simply ruled that the support of 193 other countries meant that “consensus” 
had been achieved and the Cancun Agreements had been adopted by the Conference. 
She therefore explained that “consensus does not mean unanimity”. The diplomatic 
role and acumen played by the president was widely applauded unlike the chairing 
of COP-15 in Copenhagen by Danish Prime Minister Lars Lokke Rasmussen, who 
allowed the objections by a similar same small set of five relatively unimportant 
countries (Bolivia, Cuba, Nicaragua, Sudan, and Venezuela) to derail those talks, 
which hence “noted,” but did not adopt the Copenhagen Accord in December, 2009.
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The key role played by the Mexican leadership is consistent with the notion of 
Mexico as one of a small number of “bridging states,” which can play particularly 
important roles in this process because of their credibility in the two worlds that 
engage in divisive debates in the United Nations: the developed world and the 
developing world.
Second, China and the United States set the tone for many other countries by 
dealing with each other with civility. The tone of negotiations and discussion at 
COP 16 was braced with civility and respect unlike at Copenhagen where finger 
pointing by China and the United States dominated deliberation. As Elliot Diringer 
of the Pew Center on Global Climate Change wrote;
They may have recognized that the best way to avoid blame was to avoid failure. 
Beyond this, although the credit must go to both countries, the change from last year 
in the conduct of the Chinese delegation was striking. It appeared, as Coral Davenport 
wrote in The National Journal, that the Chinese were on a “charm offensive.” 
Working in Cancun on behalf of the Harvard Project on Climate Agreements, I can 
personally vouch for the tremendous increase from previous years in the openness 
of members of the official Chinese delegation, as well as the many Chinese members 
of civil society who attended the Cancun meetings. (Stavins, 2010 p.3)
Third, a worry hovered over the Cancun meetings that an outcome perceived to 
be failure would lead to the demise of the UN process itself. This was because many 
nations (especially the developing countries, which made up the vast majority of 
the 194 countries present in Cancun) very much want the United Nations and the 
UNFCCC to remain the core of international negotiations on climate change, that 
implicit threat provided a strong incentive for many countries to make sure that the 
Cancun talks did not “fail.”
Fourth, the negotiators continued a process for the construction of a sound 
foundation for meaningful, long term global action. The acceptance of the Cancun 
Agreements suggests that the international diplomatic community could be said to have 
recognized that incremental steps in the right direction are better than acrimonious 
debates over unachievable targets (like as it was in the Copenhagen conference).
According to Narain (2010) the Cancun conference was concluded in a deal in that 
it endorsed an arrangement that emission reduction commitments of industrialized 
countries will be decided on the voluntary pledge they make. They will tell us how 
much they can cut and by when. The US, which has been instrumental in getting the 
deal at Cancun, is the biggest winner because she is the largest emitter of greenhouse 
gases and will be free to cut emission at a convenient rate without having much 
negative impact on her economy if there will be.
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The principle of equity in burden sharing prevailed at the conference. Under the 
Cancun deal, all countries including India and China are now committed to reduce 
emissions (a plus to COP 15) because of the operation of the principle. The pledge 
of the parties to the conference was to reduce energy intensity by 20-25 per cent by 
2020 which is part of the global deal. At the start of the meeting nobody would have 
envisaged that the burden of the transition or change could shift to the developing 
world but the conclusion was of all countries bearing willingly a percentage of GHG 
control that they are capable of curbing within the ceiling fixed.
COP 17 Durban 2010 Climate Conference
The past two decades have witnessed attempts at global agreements on tackling climate 
change which have been futile and this includes the problems at the Copenhagen 
conference and the tussle to save the multilateral climate regime in Cancun (Ares, 
2012). Many decisions were postponed until Durban which included the decision 
on what will succeed the Kyoto protocol. The United Nations Climate Change 
Conference in Durban, South Africa took place in 2011,
At Durban, the Parties decided “to launch a process to develop a protocol, 
another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention 
applicable to all Parties.” The Durban platform had a mandate of negotiating a 
new climate agreement which will be “applicable to all.” COP 17 was resolute on 
concluding a new agreement by 2015 and enters into force in 2020. Negotiations 
for a new agreement was characterised by much disagreements over the roles 
of the developing countries and the industrialised ones. The dispute was on the 
removal of the distinction and obligation between Annex I (developed countries) 
and non-Annex I countries (traditionally developing countries) that was instituted 
in the Framework Convention of 1992. The argument of Annex 1 countries is that 
the obligation imposed on the industrialised countries by the Convention and the 
Kyoto Protocol have not existed for less industrialised countries and the distinction 
was outdated. They argued that the reasons for the distinction was no longer valid 
because the developing countries are now wealthier than the traditional industrialised 
countries and there contribution to the global emission has also increased rapidly 
(Obergassel, Lukas, Mersmann, Ott, and Wuppertal, 2016: 8). The new formula 
therefore for another legal instrument was a compromise between, the EU and many 
developing countries on the one hand and on the other hand the US, China and India 
who insisted that there should be no new commitments for developing countries 
(Obergassel, Lukas, Mersmann, Ott, and Wuppertal, 2016).
Despite the disagreements, a number of feats were achieved at Durban. One of 
the achievements of the Durban summit is the decision reached to extend the Kyoto 
Protocol after the end of its first commitment period in 2012. This allowed for the 
47
From Kyoto to Paris
continuity of the existing tools and mechanisms which are the Clean Development 
Mechanism, the registries and Joint Implementation until 2017 or 2020.
The Durban platform for Enhanced Action was also established. The Protocol will 
be prepared by the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced 
Action (ADP). The new Protocol would be legally binding and applicable to all 
Parties (Erbach, 2015). The Platform also included a second period of commitment 
of the Kyoto Protocol which kicked off on January 2013 and would also avoid the 
gaps in the first commitment period. Russia, USA and Japan however refused to 
sign up to the second Kyoto Protocol commitment period. New rule on forestry 
were approved to advance the Protocol’s environmental veracity (Euroclima, 2012).
The initiative of the EU and the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) was able 
to agree on identifying options for closing the “ambition gap” between the objective 
of ensuring global warming is kept below 2°C and current emissions reduction 
pledges for 2020. The establishment of new market based mechanisms was another 
giant stride achieved at COP 17. The new market mechanisms were established to 
reduce emission and complement the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) as 
well as enhance the cost effectiveness of actions. Climate change issues related to 
agriculture were also discusses with the view of arriving at a policy decision at the 
end of 2012 (Euroclima, 2012).
COP 17 established a Technology Mechanism to facilitate technology development, 
transfer adaptation and finance (Erbach, 2015). The conference at Durban established 
the Technology Executive Committee that had the responsibility of providing analysis, 
recommendation and linking various institutions related on developing technologies 
as well as its transfer. The Climate Technology Centre and Network was charged 
with matching the technological needs of developing countries. An Adaptation 
Committee will provide parties technical supports; disseminate information; analyse 
information made available by the Parties and also provide recommendations on 
adaptation (Oberthur, Antonio, Vina and Morgan, 2015)
A new platform for financing a green climate was established. The new Green 
Climate Fund was set up as a major medium for promoting low-carbon climate 
resilient growth through multilateral climate financing (Euroclima, 2012). Other 
acheivements include the formation of a new working group to formulate a new 
climate design or framework involving all countries by 2015 for implementation 
by 2020. For the first time, emerging economies especially China was willing to 
discuss emission reduction goals to be implemented in 2020 (Morel, Bellassen, 
Deheza, Delbosc and Leguet, 2011).
The Durban Package marks a constellation of international, national and sub-
national institutions and actors with expertise capacity and authority to address climate 
change. The Durban conference therefore marked a breakthrough in international 
efforts to combat climate change.
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COP 21 Paris 2015 Climate Conferences 
and Paris Accord Ratification
After two decades of global climate efforts, UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, the COP 21 Paris 2015 provided a platform to arrive at a landmark agreement 
to chart a new course in the global climate change comparable to Kyoto agreement. 
The outcome in Paris was a four years negotiation rounds which commenced at 
the 17th Conference of the Parties in Durban 2011. The Agreement eventually 
ratified on 12 December 2015 by 196 parties to the UN Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was a milestone in international climate policy 
and multilateral deliberations. The Paris Accord ratification is a multilateral treaty 
in which both developing and developed countries agreed to take responsibility 
which will be entrenched in their national context yet geared towards a global goal 
of holding temperature “well below” 2°C while also pursuing effort to stay below 
1.5°C (Climate focus, 2015).
The agreement also represents a landmark in distinguishing between developed and 
developing countries. It was slightly able to move beyond the 1992 Kyoto agreement 
which established sternly distinct commitments for the two groups of countries. Paris 
agreement supplemented the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities 
with its fundamental obligations for all parties and by its array of procedures used 
to institute difference between parties (Bodle, Donat and Duwe, 2016).
The Paris Agreement defines a universal, legal framework to ‘strengthen the global 
response to the threat of climate change’ (Art. 2) (C2ES, 2015). The essential legal 
obligations are procedural. The Agreement does not specify mitigation actions or 
the timeline for the achievement of emission levels. Rather it focuses on individual 
national climate mitigation plans that would be achieved via a transparency framework. 
That is, for the first time, on the history of climate change diplomacy, each country 
will develop its own plan for climate change mitigation and then communicate the 
plan and contribution to the secretariat of the Convention. It give Parties a five-year 
‘cycles’, to prepare voluntary ‘nationally determined contributions’ (NDCs), report 
on implementation of NDCs, justify their contributions and frequently improve 
the strategy in the light of a universal stocktake. In the light of this, developing 
countries will continue to get support to pursue their NDCs and in reporting their 
climate change situations. Consequently, one accomplishment of the Paris Accord is 
its heavy reliance on the cooperation and determination of national efforts pursued 
on transparency and regular reports of progress and achievements (Bodle, Donat 
and Duwe, 2016). It also provided a platform for international review of both the 
strategies and actual achievements of the NDCs.
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The agreement also pays cognisance to the different responsibilities and starting 
points of countries. Article 2.2 accentuates that the Agreement will be implemented 
in harmony with the ‘principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capabilities’ which applies ‘in the light of different national circumstances.’ 
This implies that the fight against climate change will be led by the developed 
countries, which also will in turn; provide support to the actions taken by the 
developing countries in this direction.
In spite of the challenges in presenting its legal details, clearly presents political 
narrative on its objectives and the actions expected of Parties to achieve them. It 
provides direction on the flow of finance and technology. Like COP 17, developed 
countries shall provide financial and capacity building support and information on 
technology transfer to developing countries who will make information available 
on the support received and more needs (Arts. 9-11).
The Paris Accord also explored the strengths of interdependence, transparency 
and sincerity amongst nations to drive global emission reduction. Article 13 provides 
an ‘enhanced transparency framework for action and support’ that will offer a 
distinct insight of mitigation action. The Paris Agreement was designed to thrive 
on openness and exchange of information amongst the Parties
However, the setback for the Accord just like Kyoto happened in America where 
a party that is skeptical of climate change was again elected to replace the one that 
galvanized the world to reach the agreement
The administration of Donald Trump argues that US compliance with the Paris 
accord could “cost America as much as 2.7 million lost jobs by 2025, according 
to the National Economic Research Associates.” Why risk that when the Paris 
Agreement would lead to only a minuscule reduction in global temperature. Trump 
further argued that in “14 days of carbon emissions from China alone would wipe 
out the gains from America’s expected reductions in the year 2030.” Another 
reason advanced by Trump is that America remaining in the agreement would cost 
the US economy “close to $3 trillion in lost GDP and 6.5 million industrial jobs, 
while households would have $7,000 less income, and in many cases, much worse 
than that.” To Donald Trump the US participation would require the US to pay a 
significant sum about $3 billion to the Green Climate Fund that was set up by the 
accord when many of the other countries have not spent anything. And many of 
them will never pay one dime.
Though most of the reasons cited by the United States president has been 
rebuffed, the action of the US present a danger to the future implementation of the 
Paris agreement by parties (Variensky, 2017)
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IS MULTILATERALISM DEAD?
A system can be defined a set of components with identifiable attributes, among 
which patterned relationships persist over a period of time. It is composed of parts 
or units that are independent, acting individually but interrelated as they all function 
for the central purpose of the success or the welfare of the system as a whole. The 
international system is the environment in which international actors (typically states) 
interact. It is made up of parts that are hierarchical as some are more significant 
than others, interacting with each other to produce an outcome. In the international 
political system, these parts are nation-states, international organizations, and several 
other entities that have power of an international scale.
The enduring features of the international political system are perpetuation of the 
territorial nation-state, the corresponding support for the principle of sovereignty, 
reliance on self-help measures (rather than a supranational authority) to achieve 
national political measures. Derivation of international legal norms and obligations 
from both custom and formal consent, acceptance of the pursuit of power through 
preparation for war, structural inequalities through the persistence of various 
hierarchies - economic, political and resource hierarchies, as well as military 
asymmetries independence, cooperation, dependence, sanction and underdevelopment 
are the hallmark of international system (Kegley & Wittkopf, 1999).
Thus the characteristic of the international system defines how actors would act 
in the face of challenges of common effects like terrorism, climate change and it 
attendant consequences. Put differently, the features of the international system like 
interdependence, dependence, cooperation, and sanction have become permanent 
characteristics of the structure of relations in world politics. States will continue to 
be confronted by calamities beyond their capacities or on a large scale.
Multilateralism is not dead but is in coma. The pursuit of the national interest 
of a state is the driving force of a country’s foreign policy. Therefore states worry 
about a division of possible gains that may favour others more than itself. Though 
the Westphalia state is waning, the worry by state parties of becoming dependent 
on others and losing their autonomy still reinforce resistance to multilaterism.
The world faces old and new security challenges that are more complex for a 
single state to handle. This has placed a demand on the principle of cooperation 
and interdependence on the various actors in the international system. International 
cooperation is ever more necessary in meeting these challenges however; many are 
unilaterally acting to cut emissions in ways that are consistent with the development 
priorities of their individual states (Smith, 2009). In his Nobel lecture, President 
Obama acknowledged the importance of multilateralism when he stated that the 
world must come together to confront climate change: “There is little scientific 
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dispute that if we do nothing, we will face more drought, more famine, more mass 
displacement – all of which will fuel more conflict for decades” (Obama, 2009).
In spite of the general belief that the world need to act in a concerted manner 
to tackle climate change some of the issues articulated below (some are mentioned 
above) still militate against the collective combating of climate change. First are 
the uncertainties on the cost and benefit of GHG abatement that render decision-
making in climate policy very difficult. Second, there are only weak economic and 
political mechanisms to enforce cooperative behavior between sovereign countries 
(Bohringer, 2003). The third point is the lack of a supranational authority that could 
coerce countries into the implementation of globally efficient climate policies. The 
main challenge to climate policy is thus to shape international agreements that create 
incentives for sovereign states to enter cooperation (Bohringer, 2003).
Countries that benefit less from cooperation would definitely not comply because 
it is an investment in an unproductive or unprofitable business (Botteon & Carraro, 
1993).
The fourth major challenge of achieving multilateral objective on climate change 
is that countries especially the developing ones fear goal of the collective bodies. 
There remains a fear that the global environmental goals are being set according to 
the agenda of countries in the global industrialized north, particularly the United 
States that on two different occasions constituted a wedge to solving global problems 
using multilateral platform.
CONCLUSION
Fundamentally, the creation of international institutions by states is to create a 
means of achieving collective objectives that cannot be achieved individually. As 
such, the preservation of the already disappearing global environment demands 
some devolution of sovereign powers under a recognized multilateral institution.
Though countless negotiations after the breakthrough in Kyoto left many 
disillusioned on the capacity of multilateral institution to build a global consensus and 
facilitate nation-state commitment on implementation, the triumph of environmental 
activists and state parties in Paris 2015 and the subsequent ratification of the 
agreement is still dependent on the vagaries of political outcome in the US. However, 
the action of the Trump administration to pull US out of the agreement, can only be 
a temporary setback. This is apt given the unison of the rest of the world to forge 
ahead with the Paris accord even without the United States.
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